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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 In these appeals, Reginald D. McGlory challenges the 
district court's refusal to set aside default judgments in three 
separate civil in rem forfeiture proceedings brought under 21 
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).0  McGlory raises five separate issues -- lack 
                                                           
0The Honorable Marjorie O. Rendell, District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
0The provision states in relevant part: 
 
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United 
States and no property right shall exist in them: 
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of notice, double jeopardy, wrong standard in refusing to set 
aside default judgments, insufficient reasons for refusing to set 
aside default judgment, and misstatement or fraud on the part of 
the government.  Because we find that the government violated 
McGlory's due process rights by failing to provide him with 
adequate notice of two of the proceedings, we reverse the 
district court's judgments in those proceedingsi and remand those 
cases for further proceedings.  However, we reject McGlory's 
double jeopardy argument and therefore affirm the district 
court's judgment in the remaining proceeding.  We also reject 
McGlory's remaining arguments. 
 
I. 
 On September 8, 1989, as part of a criminal investigation of 
McGlory, federal Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") and 
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") agents executed a search warrant 
at 4265-67 Bryn Mawr Road in Pittsburgh.  Among other things, the 
agents seized the items that are the subject of the three 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 * * * 
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other 
things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any 
person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation 
of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an 
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and 
securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any 
violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall 
be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the 
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission 
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted 
without the knowledge or consent of that owner. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (emphases added). 
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proceedings on appeal: $14,584.50 in cash ("$14K")0; three 
statues0; and an apparently separate collection of $184,505.01 in 
cash ("$184K").0  The agents also arrested McGlory.  He was 
eventually convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and to 
possess heroin with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846; possession of heroin with intent to distribute, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possession of 
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§922(g)(1); using a firearm in a drug trafficking operation, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and laundering drug proceeds, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 314-15 (3d Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1388 (1993). 
 The DEA began separate administrative forfeiture proceedings 
against the $14K and the statues.0  McGlory, who was 
incarcerated, received notice of both proceedings in prison, 
Supplemental Appendix ("Supp. App.")0 at 60, 23, but filed no 
administrative claims in either proceeding.  Id.  Upon the filing 
of administrative claims by Sandra McGlory (McGlory's wife) and 
Ola Mae McGlory (his mother) to the $14K and the statues, 
                                                           
0United States v. $14,548.50 in U.S. Currency (No. 94-3674). 
0United States v. One Marble Indian Statue, One Replica Remington 
Rattlesnake Statue (No. 94-3675). 
0United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency (No. 94-3528). 
0The DEA referred the forfeiture of the $184K to the United 
States Attorney for judicial forfeiture, because its value 
exceeded $100,000, the maximum allowable amount for the less 
cumbersome administrative forfeiture process.  App. 77. 
0As used in this opinion, Appendix ("App.") and Supplemental 
Appendix ("Supp. App.") refer to the appendices submitted by 
McGlory and the government, respectively. 
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respectively, Supp. App. 52, 55, 60, 23, the DEA referred the 
forfeitures to the United States Attorney, who filed complaints 
for civil forfeiture on February 7, 1990 (for the $14K) and 
February 28, 1990 (for the statues). 
 The government served McGlory with the complaints via first 
class and certified mail at the Bryn Mawr Road address, where his 
mother signed both certified mail receipts.  Supp. App. 43, 213-
16, 4.  In her affidavit, McGlory's mother claimed not to 
remember receiving the notices but stated that she would have 
turned any such notices over to the attorney who was representing 
McGlory on the criminal charges, Thomas Ceraso, Esq.  Appendix 
("App.") at 117.  The government did not serve McGlory in prison, 
and made no attempt to do so. 
 McGlory did not file any claim or answer in either 
proceeding, App. 1-6, 27, 31, and the district court entered 
default judgments against him on May 29, 1990, and July 23, 1990, 
forfeiting the $14K and the statues, respectively.  App. 21-22. 
McGlory filed motions to set aside the default judgments on April 
21, 1994.  App. 34. 43.  After referring the matter to a 
magistrate judge, who recommended that the default judgments not 
be reopened, the district court denied McGlory's motions.  App. 
3, 9. 
 The government filed a complaint for civil forfeiture of the 
$184K on November 21, 1989.  App. 7, 17.  The government served 
the complaint on McGlory via first class and certified mail at 
the Bryn Mawr Road address, as well as on Mr. Ceraso.  Supp. App. 
19.  When McGlory again failed to file any claim or answer, the 
6 
government obtained a default judgment.  Supp. App. 99, 111.  On 
McGlory's behalf, Mr. Ceraso then filed a claim of ownership and 
a motion to set aside the entry of default, which the government 
did not oppose, and the court set aside the judgment.  Supp. App. 
102-10, 112.  McGlory again failed to file an answer within the 
time allotted by the court, and the court entered another default 
judgment against him on April 12, 1991.  Supp. App. 129; App. 23. 
On July 15, 1994, McGlory filed a motion to set aside this second 
default judgment, which the district court denied. 
 
II. 
 McGlory first argues that his due process rights were 
violated in that the government failed to provide him with 
adequate notice of the civil forfeiture proceedings against the 
$14K and the statues.  Relying primarily on the Supreme Court's 
decision in Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972), McGlory 
argues that the Due Process Clause required that the government 
serve him with notice of the forfeiture proceedings in prison.0 
 By virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2451, civil in rem forfeiture 
proceedings are governed by Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for 
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.  As the government notes, 
Rule C(4) requires only publication, not personal service of 
                                                           
0
 McGlory also denies that he resided at the Bryn Mawr Road 
address prior to his arrest, claiming that the house at that 
address was his mother's home.  McGlory Br. at 6, 9-11.  The 
government points to extensive evidence that McGlory did in fact 
reside at 4265-67 Bryn Mawr Road.  Gov't Br. at 7 n.1.  Because 
we conclude that the government should have served (or at least 
attempted to serve) McGlory in prison, we need not resolve this 
dispute concerning McGlory's pre-arrest address. 
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process.  However, for due process purposes, publication alone is 
not sufficient when the government can reasonably ascertain the 
names and addresses of interested parties.  Mennonite Board of 
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983). 
 McGlory argues, in our view persuasively, that Robinson and 
Adams together required that the government at least make an 
attempt to serve him with notice of the forfeiture proceedings in 
prison.  In most important respects, Robinson appears 
indistinguishable from the present case.  In Robinson, 
the State knew that appellant was not at the 
address to which the notice was mailed and, 
moreover, knew also that appellant could not get 
to that address since he was at that very time 
confined in . . . jail.  Under these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the State 
made any effort to provide notice which was 
"reasonably calculated" to apprise appellant of 
the pendency of the forfeiture proceedings. 
 
Robinson, 409 U.S. at 40 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); see also United States v. 
Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1993) (when government knows 
of party's actual whereabouts, due process requires sending of 
notice to that address, especially where party is incarcerated); 
accord United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 511 (1st Cir. 
1995). 
 The government's counterarguments are unavailing.  The 
government cites Rule C(4) to show that it had no statutory duty 
to inform McGlory, but this argument is not dispositive for due 
process purposes.  Equally unpersuasive is the actual notice of 
the administrative forfeiture proceedings that McGlory received 
8 
while he was in prison, since the judicial forfeiture proceedings 
were separate proceedings from the administrative actions. 
 The government also claims that its actions satisfied the 
Mullane standard, and attempts to distinguish Robinson by noting 
that the defendant in Robinson did not receive notice of the 
proceeding until after it had concluded, whereas McGlory had 
actual notice of the proceedings from two sources: the notice of 
the administrative proceedings and the notice of the civil 
proceedings received by his attorney from McGlory's mother.  As 
noted above, we do not find the notice of the administrative 
proceedings that McGlory received while in prison to be 
significant for purposes of the subsequent judicial proceedings. 
Furthermore, the government's arguments concerning the notice 
received by McGlory's attorney are flawed.0 
 The government, citing United States v. Indoor Cultivation 
Equipment, 55 F.3d 1311 (7th Cir. 1995), argues that the receipt 
of notice by McGlory's attorney constituted actual notice to 
McGlory.  However, Indoor Cultivation Equipment and the case it 
cited, United States v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1495 (7th Cir. 
1989), involved situations where the litigation had already begun 
and the party's attorney had received notice of an important fact 
or deadline but had failed to act on it.  The important Supreme 
                                                           
0The parties dispute whether there is sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that McGlory's attorney in the criminal case, 
Thomas Ceraso, Esq., received the notices of the civil forfeiture 
proceedings from McGlory's mother.  There seems to be strong 
evidence that he did receive the notices, including Mrs. 
McGlory's affidavit, App. 123.  For purposes of this analysis, we 
assume that Mr. Ceraso received actual notice of the proceedings. 
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Court cases in this area, Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 
(1962), and Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320 (1879), also involved 
such situations, as opposed to initial service of process on a 
defendant. 
 The situation presented here -- where the proceedings had 
not yet begun, McGlory was therefore not yet a party,0 and Mr. 
Ceraso was not yet his attorney in these proceedings -- is easily 
distinguishable from that in Indoor Cultivation and the other 
cases cited above.  Plainly stated, for purposes of the civil 
forfeiture proceedings against the $14K and the statues, McGlory 
did not have an attorney at the time process was received by Mr. 
Ceraso; hence, service on Mr. Ceraso was not service on McGlory's 
attorney, and thus could not constitute actual notice to 
McGlory.0 
 
III. 
                                                           
0Indeed, with regard to McGlory's double jeopardy argument, see 
Part IV infra, the government claims that McGlory was never a 
party to the first forfeiture proceeding. 
0Cases construing Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
highlight the distinctiveness of service of process. Rule 4(d)(3) 
permits service upon an individual "by delivery of a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process."  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 4(d)(3).  When the agent is the individual's attorney, 
numerous courts have held that the validity of service of process 
upon the attorney depends upon actual authority on the part of 
the attorney to receive process on behalf of the individual. See, 
e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 436 F.2d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 1971) 
(service upon attorney was ineffective where attorney had not 
been appointed for that precise task); Schwarz v. Thomas, 222 
F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (attorney representing defendant in 
another litigation has no authority to accept service of process 
in a separate suit); Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, 
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1223, 1234 (E.D. Wis. 1993) and cases cited. 
10 
 McGlory next argues that the forfeitures in Nos. 94-3675 
(statues) and 94-3528 ($184K) should be set aside as multiple 
punishments imposed on him for the same offense in violation of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because they 
came after the forfeiture of the $14K in No. 94-3674 and (in the 
case of the $184K) after McGlory's criminal conviction.0 
According to McGlory, this result is compelled by the Supreme 
Court's decisions in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 
(1989), Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), and 
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 
(1994).0 
                                                           
0The following chronology is relevant to this discussion: 
 
(1) No. 94-3674 ($14K) 
  Complaint filed: February 7, 1990 
  Jeopardy attached: Never (see Part III.B infra) 
  Default judgment entered: May 30, 1990 
 
 (2) No. 94-3675 (statues) 
  Complaint filed: February 28, 1990 
  Jeopardy attached: Never (see Part III.B infra) 
  Default judgment entered: July 24, 1990 
 
 (3) Criminal conviction 
  Superseding indictment filed: December 13, 1989 
  Jeopardy attached: April 25, 1990 
  Judgment of conviction and sentence: February 12, 1991 
 
 (4) No. 94-3528 ($184K) 
  Complaint filed: November 21, 1989 
Jeopardy attached: No earlier than May 4, 1990, when 
McGlory was made a party (see footnote 14 infra). 
  Default judgment entered: April 12, 1991 
0McGlory did not raise his double jeopardy argument in the 
district court.  Hence, the alleged constitutional violation is 
reviewable only for plain error.  United States v. Olano, 113 S. 
Ct. 1770 (1993). 
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 McGlory's double jeopardy argument fails on several grounds. 
First, because he never filed a claim in the proceeding against 
the $14K or the proceeding against the statues, he was never "in 
jeopardy" in those proceedings.  Second, none of the forfeitures 
constituted "punishment" within the meaning of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  Finally, none of the proceedings were based on 
the "same offense." 
A. 
 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides 
that no person may "be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  This 
clause also applies to imprisonment and monetary penalties, Ex 
parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874), and it has been held 
to protect against "three distinct abuses: a second prosecution 
for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for 
the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for 
the same offense."  Halper, 490 U.S. at 440. 
 In three decisions issued in the last seven years, the 
Supreme Court has held that, in certain circumstances, 
constitutional limitations that had previously been thought to 
apply only to criminal sanctions also serve to limit the 
imposition of civil sanctions.  In United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 435 (1989), the Court extended double jeopardy limitations 
to civil penalties that are not solely remedial in purpose, 
holding that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who 
has already been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be 
subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the 
12 
second sanction may not be fairly characterized as remedial, but 
only as a deterrent or retribution."  Id. at 448-49.  The 
defendant in Halper had previously been convicted for 65 counts 
of violating the criminal false claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287, 
by filing false Medicare claims totalling less than $600.  He was 
then sued by the government under the civil False Claims Act, 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731, which prescribed a $2,000 civil penalty per 
violation.  Based on the record of the prior criminal 
prosecution, the district court granted summary judgment for the 
government on the issue of liability, but the court held that the 
imposition of the full civil penalties prescribed by the statute 
would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.  On direct 
appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the statutory penalty as 
applied to Halper violated double jeopardy.  The Court held that 
the civil penalty constituted punishment because in this "rare 
case" the civil penalty bore "no rational relationship to the 
goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather 
appear[ed] to qualify as 'punishment' in the plain sense of the 
word."  490 U.S. at 449.  The Court remanded the case to the 
district court to determine the size of the civil sanction that 
the government could receive without crossing the line between 
remedy and punishment.  Id. at 450. 
 In Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), the 
Court considered two other forfeiture provisions of the 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and 881(a)(7), 
which provide for the forfeiture of, respectively, conveyances 
and real property used or intended for use in illegal drug-
13 
related activities.  21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4), (a)(7).  Drawing on 
"the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment," 
Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2810, on the language of §§ 881(a)(4) and 
(a)(7), and on the legislative history of § 881, the Court found 
that forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) does not solely 
serve a remedial purpose and hence must be considered 
"punishment" under Halper.  As such, the Court concluded, 
forfeitures under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are subject to the 
limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Id. 
at 2812. 
 In so holding, the Austin Court rejected two arguments 
offered by the government in an attempt to show that §§ 881(a)(4) 
and (a)(7) are remedial and not punitive.  First, the Court 
rejected the government's characterization of the conveyances and 
real property covered by the two sections as "instruments" of the 
drug trade, forfeiture of which could be considered remedial. See 
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 
(1984).  Second, the Court rejected the government's attempt to 
liken such forfeitures to those involved in customs violations, 
which serve as "a reasonable form of liquidated damages," One Lot 
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972), 
that compensate for the costs imposed by illegal drug activity on 
the government and on society as a whole. "[T]he dramatic 
variations in the value of conveyances and real property 
forfeitable under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)," the Court concluded, 
"undercut any similar argument with respect to those provisions."  
Austin v. U.S., 409 U.S. at 2812. 
14 
 Most recently, in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth 
Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), the Court held that the imposition 
of a tax under Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act after the 
taxpayer had already been punished in a separate criminal 
proceeding represented a second "punishment" for the same offense 
in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  While noting the 
holding of Halper that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a 
defendant already punished in a criminal proceeding from having a 
nonremedial civil sanction imposed against him in a separate 
proceeding, the Court found the Halper method of determining 
whether a civil sanction is punitive to be inapplicable to tax 
statutes.  Id. at 1944-45.   Instead, focusing on a number of 
specific characteristics of the tax -- its high rate, its 
deterrent purpose, the fact that it is conditioned on the 
commission of a crime, the limitation of its scope to taxpayers 
who have already been arrested for the very conduct that gives 
rise to the tax obligation, and the fact that it is levied on 
goods that the taxpayer no longer owns or possesses -- the Court 
concluded that the tax is fairly characterized as punishment. Id. 
at 1946-48. 
 Resolution of McGlory's double jeopardy claim regarding the 
civil forfeitures requires answers to three distinct questions: 
Was McGlory "in jeopardy" in the first forfeiture proceeding? Did 
the forfeitures under § 881(a)(6) constitute "punishment"? And 
finally, did the offenses underlying the first forfeiture and 
15 
McGlory's criminal conviction represent the "same offense" as 
those underlying either of the two later forfeitures?0 
B. 
 As noted in Part I supra, McGlory did not file any claim of 
ownership or answer to the complaint of forfeiture in either of 
the first two civil forfeiture proceedings.  He did not 
participate in either proceeding until default judgments had 
already been entered against him.  His first appearance in either 
proceedings was the filing of a motion to set aside the default 
judgment, in each case some four years after the judgment had 
been entered. 
 A forfeiture proceeding in which a party does not 
participate does not place that party in jeopardy, and therefore 
that party cannot use that forfeiture as the basis of a double 
jeopardy challenge to a subsequent proceeding.  As the Seventh 
Circuit stated in United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, (7th 
Cir.) (holding that a forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) in 
                                                           
0Another issue presented by any double jeopardy claim is whether 
the proceedings in which punishment has allegedly been imposed 
were separate proceedings or, alternatively, constituted a 
single, coordinated proceeding; if the latter is true, the double 
jeopardy argument fails.  See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 
1945 ("Montana could no doubt collect its tax . . . if it had 
assessed the tax in the same proceeding that resulted in [the 
taxpayer's] conviction."); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-
69 (1983) ("Where . . . a legislature specifically authorizes 
cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether 
those two statutes proscribe the 'same' conduct . . . the 
prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose 
cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial."). 
We assume without deciding that the various forfeiture 
proceedings and McGlory's criminal trial were all separate 
proceedings. 
16 
which the claimant did not file a claim did not place the 
claimant in jeopardy for Fifth Amendment purposes), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 669 (1994): "You can't have double jeopardy without a 
former jeopardy."  Id. at 1465 (citing Serfass v. United States, 
420 U.S. 377, 389 (1975)); see also United States v. Penny, 60 
F.3d 1257 (7th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 
____ (U.S. Oct. 24, 1995) (No. 95-6698). 
 In United States v. Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 
1995), the Fifth Circuit followed the reasoning of Torres in 
rejecting the double jeopardy claim of a defendant who had not 
participated in an earlier administrative forfeiture proceeding. 
"As Arreola did not appear and contest the forfeiture, he was 
never in jeopardy," the court reasoned.  "Without former 
jeopardy, double jeopardy cannot arise."  Id. at 192.  Because of 
the factual similarity between Arreola-Ramos and the present 
case, the Fifth Circuit's description and dismissal of the 
defendant's legal theory bear quoting: 
[W]e perceive that Arreola's argument runs 
something like this: (1) the government arrested 
me and seized my money; (2) knowing I was in jail, 
the government instituted forfeiture proceedings 
against my money, but sent notice only to my civil 
residence; and (3) this constitutes inadequate 
notice and violates my due process rights, as I 
was unaware of and unable to contest the 
forfeiture.  Arreola then jumbles all three parts 
together and, in a transparent bit of legal 
alchemy, attempts to transmute the "lead" of a 
civil forfeiture proceeding--in which he was not 
even a party--into the "gold" of former jeopardy. 
Essentially, Arreola . . . now asks us . . . to 
overlook his absence from the forfeiture 
proceeding and to hold--not merely "in spite of" 
his absence but indeed "because of" his absence--
that former jeopardy attached in the forfeiture 
17 
proceeding.  Despite its ingenuity, this is 
nothing more than a garden variety flawed 
syllogism. 
 
Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d at 190. 
 In United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213 (3d Cir. 1995), 
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3318 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1995) 
(No. 95-630), we also adopted the Torres rationale in rejecting 
the double jeopardy argument of a defendant who had not filed a 
claim in an earlier administrative forfeiture proceeding.  In 
that case, defendant Baird sought dismissal of a superseding 
criminal indictment, arguing that it was barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause in light of the earlier forfeiture.  We found 
Baird's argument wanting, stating: "Like the double jeopardy 
claimant in Torres, as a non-party to the administrative 
forfeiture process, Baird was not, and could not have been, 
placed at risk by that process."  Id. at 1219.  While Halper 
"extended the no-double-punishments rule to civil penalties . . . 
[it] did not remove from the double jeopardy claimant's shoulders 
the burden of establishing a former jeopardy."  Id. 
 The logic of Baird applies as well to judicial forfeiture 
proceedings such as that brought against the $14K and the 
statues.  Thus, we hold that McGlory was not "in jeopardy" in 
either of the first two forfeiture proceedings.0 
                                                           
0McGlory's only argument here would have to be that he did in 
fact participate in the first forfeiture proceeding by filing his 
motion to set aside the default judgment.  However, we have 
stated that "jeopardy does not, and cannot, attach until one is 
made a party to a proceeding before a trier of fact having 
jurisdiction to try the question of guilt or innocence, and that, 
until such time, the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition 
can have no application."  Baird, 63 F.3d at 1218 (emphasis in 
18 
C. 
 In order to establish that his double jeopardy rights were 
violated, McGlory must also show that the forfeitures themselves 
constituted "punishment" under Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch. 
Two courts of appeals have addressed this issue with respect to 
§881(a)(6), reaching opposite conclusions.  Adopting the Fifth 
Circuit's reasoning and rejecting the Ninth Circuit's, we hold 
that the forfeitures here did not constitute "punishment." 
 In United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994), the Fifth Circuit held that 
forfeiture of illegal drug proceeds under § 881(a)(6) is not 
"punishment."  Applying the test of Halper -- whether the amount 
forfeited was so great that it bore "no rational relation to the 
costs incurred by government and society from the defendant's 
criminal conduct," id. at 298-99, and citing national statistics 
on revenues produced and costs imposed by illegal drug 
activities, the court held that the amounts confiscated in that 
case were not grossly disproportionate to governmental and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
original).  Under this definition, McGlory's double jeopardy 
claim fails, since until and unless the default judgment was set 
aside, McGlory was not "a party to a proceeding before a trier of 
fact having jurisdiction to try the question of guilt or 
innocence."  Alternative definitions offered by other courts of 
appeals are also of no help to McGlory in this regard.  See 
Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465 (jeopardy attaches when evidence is first 
presented to trier of fact); United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 
568, 572 (6th Cir. 1995) (in nontrial proceeding ended by a 
consent judgment, jeopardy attaches when judge accepts 
stipulation of forfeiture and enters judgment of forfeiture), 
cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 762 (1196). United States v. Kearns, 61 
F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir. 1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier 
than date on which defendant files answer to forfeiture 
complaint). 
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societal costs.  Id. at 299.   The court distinguished Austin, 
reasoning that the concerns about forfeitures of conveyances and 
real estate under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), i.e., that they could 
be wildly disproportionate to the costs imposed by the 
defendant's illegal activities, were not applicable to 
forfeitures of proceeds under § 881(a)(6).  "[T]he forfeiture of 
drug proceeds will always be directly proportional to the amount 
of drugs sold.  The more drugs sold, the more proceeds that will 
be forfeited.  As we have held, these proceeds are roughly 
proportional to the harm inflicted upon government and society by 
the drug sale."  Id. at 300. 
 Alternatively, the court held, even without the "rational 
relation" test of Halper, forfeiture of illegal drug proceeds is 
not "punishment" because of their very nature as illegally 
derived property.  "When . . . the property taken by the 
government was not derived from lawful activities, the forfeiting 
party loses nothing to which the law ever entitled him. . . . The 
possessor of proceeds from illegal drug sales never invested 
honest labor or other lawfully derived property to obtain the 
subsequently forfeited proceeds.  Consequently, he has no 
reasonable expectation that the law will protect, condone, or 
even allow, his continued possession of such proceeds because 
they have their very genesis in illegal activity."  Tilley, 18 
F.3d at 300. 
 We find the Fifth Circuit's reasoning to be sound.  We 
therefore hold that the forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6) of 
proceeds from illegal drug transactions, or proceeds traceable to 
20 
such transactions, does not constitute "punishment" within the 
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
 In so holding, we reject the contrary reasoning and 
conclusion of the Ninth Circuit regarding § 881(a)(6) in United 
States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 
1994), amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 
1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 762(1996).  Eschewing the case-
by-case approach urged by the government (and adopted by the 
Fifth Circuit in Tilley), the Ninth Circuit looked to "the entire 
scope of the statute which the government seeks to employ, rather 
than to the characteristics of the specific property the 
government seeks to forfeit."  Id. at 1220; see also id. (citing 
Austin and Kurth Ranch as compelling a "categorical approach" 
under which a court "must look to the requirements of the 
forfeiture statute as a whole").  It noted that the scope of 
§881(a)(6) was not limited to proceeds, but included all moneys 
"'furnished or intended to be furnished'" in exchange for drugs, 
and all moneys "'used or intended to be used'" to facilitate 
violations of the drug statute.  Id. at 1221 (emphases in 
opinion).  The panel's reasoning was sharply criticized in a 
seven-judge opinion dissenting from the court's denial of 
rehearing and of rehearing en banc: 
The panel's opinion collapses Halper [a double 
jeopardy case] into Austin [an excessive fines 
case], converting Halper's rule of reason for the 
"rare" case into a per se rule for the routine 
case.  It also merges the inquiry for excessive 
fines cases--whether the amount forfeited is 
partly punishment--into double jeopardy cases, 
where the issue is whether the amount forfeited is 
entirely punishment.  And, perhaps most 
21 
critically, the opinion treats proceeds, which are 
forfeitable under § 881(a)(6), like a car or a 
house used to facilitate a drug offense.  This has 
to be wrong.  89 Firearms--which Austin 
distinguishes but leaves intact--says otherwise; 
and so does the Fifth Circuit . . . . 
 
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 56 F.3d at 42-43 (Rymer, J., 
dissenting). 
D. 
 Moreover, both of McGlory's double jeopardy claims must also 
fail for an additional reason: the challenged forfeitures were 
not predicated on the "same offense" as that which formed the 
grounds for the earlier forfeiture or his criminal conviction.0 
 The basic test for determining whether two offenses are the 
"same offense" for double jeopardy purposes is the "same 
elements" test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 
U.S. 299, 304 (1932): "The applicable rule is that where the same 
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether 
                                                           
0Since Halper was decided in 1989, no court of appeals has dealt 
squarely with the "same offense" issue in connection with 
§881(a)(6).  Several courts of appeals have addressed the issue 
tangentially, or with respect to a different provision of § 881. 
See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(analyzing § 881(a)(7)), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 762 (1996); 
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1211 (9th 
Cir. 1994), (distinguishing case at bar from Missouri v Hunter, 
459 U.S. 359(1983)); amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 762 (1996) United 
States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, Tail No. N 5538V, 
Including Its Tools and Appurtenances, 37 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 
1994) (remanding for consideration of "same offense" issue under 
§ 881(a)(4)).  But see United States v. Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. 
519, 527 (D. Or. 1995) (holding that indictment and forfeiture 
under § 881(a)(6) were based on same offense where indictment 
included conspiracy count and forfeiture complaint included 
"allegations of conspiracy"). 
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there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision 
requires proof of a fact which the other does not."0  The 
Blockburger "same elements" test was confirmed in United States 
v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993), which rejected the alternative 
"same conduct" test in overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 
(1990). 
 Here, all three forfeiture complaints sought forfeiture 
"pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881."  App. 11, 14, 17.  The government 
supported its complaint against the 14K and the 184K with 
allegations that they were "proceeds from sales or exchanges of 
controlled substances, in violation of Title 21, United States 
Code."  App. 12, 18.  This language implicitly invoked 
§881(a)(6).  Regarding the statues, the government alleged that 
they were "acquired with proceeds traceable to unlawful exchanges 
of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)." 
                                                           
0The Supreme Court clarified the applicability of the Blockburger 
test in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983), where the Court 
characterized the test as a rule of statutory construction that 
bars cumulative punishments for the same offense "'in the absence 
of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.'"  
Blockburger, 459 U.S. at 366 (quoting Whalen v. United States, 
445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980)) (emphasis in Blockburger).  Thus, 
 
[w]here . . . a legislature specifically authorizes 
cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of 
whether those two statutes proscribe the "same" conduct 
under Blockburger, a court's task of statutory construction 
is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court 
or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes 
in a single trial. 
 
Id. at 368-69.  The Hunter limitation on the scope of Blockburger 
would apply in the present appeal only if the civil and criminal 
proceedings were considered a single, coordinated proceeding 
rather than separate proceedings.  See Part III.B supra. 
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App. 15.0  Our analysis thus must begin with the language of 
§881(a)(6): 
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to 
the United States and no property right shall 
exist in them: 
  * * * 
 
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, 
securities, or other things of value furnished or 
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange 
for a controlled substance in violation of this 
subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an 
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, 
and securities used or intended to be used to 
facilitate any violation of this subchapter, 
except that no property shall be forfeited under 
this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of 
an owner, by reason of any act or omission 
established by that owner to have been committed 
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of 
that owner. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).  Thus, proceeds from, or proceeds 
traceable to, exchanges of controlled substances in violation of 
"this subchapter" are subject to forfeiture.  "This subchapter" 
is subchapter I of Title 21, covering 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904.  In 
addition, section 965 makes the forfeiture provision applicable 
to violations of subchapter II, 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-971.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 965; see also United States v. Sherrett, 877 F. Supp. 519, 525-
                                                           
0This level of specificity in the forfeiture complaints 
eliminates the need to undertake a detailed examination of 
indictments, affidavits, etc. of the sort conducted by the court 
in United States v. Ailemen, 893 F. Supp. 888 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
There the court was faced with vague seizure notices that simply 
noted that the defendant's money was seized "for forfeiture under 
Title 21, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 881, because it 
was used [in] or acquired as a result of a drug related offense," 
id. at 905 (emphasis in original), and had to determine whether 
the forfeitures were based on the same offenses as those charged 
in the criminal indictments, all of which were drug-related. 
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26 (D. Or. 1995).  Therefore, forfeiture under section 881(a)(6) 
can punish a property owner only for violations of 21 U.S.C. 
§§801-971. 
 A Blockburger/Dixon analysis of the three forfeitures is 
straightforward: each forfeiture requires proof of an element 
that the others do not require, i.e., that the particular piece 
of property seized constituted illegal proceeds or was acquired 
with illegal proceeds.  McGlory's assertions notwithstanding, the 
three forfeitures among themselves do not satisfy the "same 
elements" test. 
 We must also apply the Blockburger/Dixon test to the 
offenses underlying the third forfeiture (the $184K) and those 
underlying McGlory's criminal punishment, since this last 
forfeiture followed the criminal conviction.  Of the criminal 
charges for which McGlory was indicted and convicted, only two 
fall within the range of violations covered by section 881(a)(6): 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to 
distribute, heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and 
possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).  See United States v. McGlory, 
968 F.2d 309, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
1388 (1993).  As noted above, the forfeitures were based on the 
allegations that the seized property was "proceeds from sales or 
exchanges of controlled substances" or "acquired with proceeds 
traceable to unlawful exchanges of controlled substances." 
 Under the Blockburger/Dixon test, the violations underlying 
the forfeitures and those for which McGlory was convicted also do 
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not constitute the "same offenses."  Conviction on the criminal 
charges required proof that McGlory participated in a conspiracy 
or that he possessed a controlled substance (namely, heroin); 
forfeiture under § 881(a)(6) did not require proof of either of 
these elements.  Similarly, forfeiture required proof of a sale 
or exchange, and proof that the specific property was proceeds 
of, or traceable to, a sale or exchange; neither of the criminal 
charges required proof of either of these elements.0 
 
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we reverse the orders of the 
district court and remand for further proceedings not 
                                                           
0Halper and Kurth Ranch provide a useful contrast to the present 
case.  The criminal and civil charges against Halper were both 
based on his submission of the 65 false Medicare claims. The 
criminal false claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287, prohibited 
"mak[ing] or present[ing] . . . any claim upon or against the 
United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such 
claim to be false, fictitious or fraudulent."  The civil False 
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, prohibited "knowingly mak[ing], 
us[ing], or caus[ing] to be made or used, a false record or 
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved." 
See Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-38. 
 The statute at issue in Kurth Ranch imposed a tax on the 
possession and storage of dangerous drugs.  See Kurth Ranch, 114 
S. Ct. at 1941.  Thus, it was "conditioned on the commission of a 
crime."  Id. at 1947.  Moreover, the Court explained: "In this 
case, the tax assessment not only hinges on the commission of a 
crime, it is also exacted only after the taxpayer has been 
arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax 
obligation in the first place."  Id.  Thus, while neither Halper 
nor Kurth Ranch explicitly addressed the "same offense" issue, it 
seems clear that in both cases application of the 
Blockburger/Dixon test would have shown that both punishments 
were based on the same offense. 
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inconsistent with this opinion in Nos. 94-3674 and 94-3675, and 
affirm the order of the district court in No. 94-3528.0 
                                                           
0Judge Sloviter concurs with all of this opinion except for 
section III.D.  Neither party has briefed the "same offense" 
issue, and the district court, which did not discuss the double 
jeopardy issue at all, obviously never addressed this particular 
issue.  Under these circumstances I would leave that issue for 
another day. 
